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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether plaintiff waived his objection to Jury-

Instruction No. 19.
2.

If plaintiff did not waive his objection, whether the

trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 19.
3.

If the trial erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 19,

whether that error was harmless.
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding as cost an appearance fee that defendant was required
to pay plaintiff's expert for his deposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

In order to preserve an objection to a jury

instruction, "a party must object with specificity at trial."
Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Company, 704 P.2d 573, 579
(Utah 1985).
2.

Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness.

Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation. 862 P.2d 1342,
1346 (Utah 1993).
3.

An error in a jury instruction, even when properly

preserved and presented on appeal, is considered harmless when
"there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120
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(Utah 198 9).

An error which is not properly preserved cannot be

considered on appeal unless it is "obvious.11 JEd. at 121.
4.

Cost awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah App. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The jury found both plaintiff and defendant negligent. (RR.
180-81)

The jury found that plaintiff's negligence exceeded

defendant's (60/40) and on that basis ruled in defendant's
favor. (R. 181)
Plaintiff is not arguing that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence.

Plaintiff is complaining about one of

the jury instructions given by the trial court.

A factual

statement would be helpful in evaluating that instruction.

The

facts stated in the light most favorable to the verdict are as
follows:
1.

The accident happened on the day after Christmas, 1990.

(R. 292)
2.

Plaintiff was driving a fuel tanker for Sunburst

Transport. (R. 273)
3.

Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice that had formed on

the floor of the outdoor fuel loading bay owned and operated by
defendant. (RR. 291, 292, 297)
4.

Plaintiff knew the floor was slippery that day, but did

not stop work. (RR. 291, 292, 297)
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5.

Plaintiff slipped and hurt himself while trying to

force the fuel loading arm on the valve farthest from the pump.
(RR. 277, 278, 290)
6.

Plaintiff did not report his incident to defendant.

(RR. 279, 332)
7.

Defendant recognized that ice would occasionally form

on the floor of the outdoor loading bay. (R. 334)
8.

Defendant knew this was an area that needed to be

salted in the winter. (R. 338)
9.

Defendant knew that on occasion the area had to be

hand-salted. (R. 339)
10.

Defendant knew that on occasion the area had to be re-

salted later in the same day. (R. 33 9)
11.

It was the habit of the gentleman who was on duty the

day of the accident (Paul Hatch) to supply the drivers with rock
salt and a shovel so they could clear ice if they found it on
the floor of the loading bay. (RR. 334, 335)
12.

Mr. Hatch would have eliminated any dangerous or

hazardous condition reported to or observed by him. (R. 33 7)
13.

It was the habit of Mr. Hatch to perform a metering

function on each of the pumps before opening for the day. (R.
327)
14.

To do this, he had to stand directly in front of the

pumps in the same place where the drivers stood to load fuel.
(RR. 327-28)
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15.

Mr. Hatch would have remembered if there had been

dangerously slick conditions on the floor of the loading bay on
the day in question. (R. 337)
16.

Though there were other drivers in the same area as

plaintiff that day, none of them reported an incident. (RR. 337,
348)
17.

Defendant made an attempt to roughen the surface of

the loading bay floor to improve its traction. (RR. 344, 34 9)
18

Defendant considered but did not employ metal grates to

improve traction. (RR. 342-43)
The trial court refused the jury instructions requested
both by plaintiff and defendant on premises liability. (R. 354)
Defendant requested an instruction that required plaintiff to
prove defendant had "notice" of the hazardous condition
complained of. (R. 46)

The trial court rejected defendant's

instruction because, as the trial court concluded, "this is one
of those cases where the hazard essentially has been created by
the owner, if in fact one has been created, and therefore he has
notice of that and that's not required." (R. 354, lines 3-11)
Plaintiff requested an instruction doing away with the
"notice" requirement. (RR. 352-53)

The trial court considered

plaintiff's instruction to be unnecessary since he was not
giving a notice instruction. (R. 354, lines 18-20)

In fact, the

trial court determined that Instruction No. 19 (R. 108) went
further than the instruction requested by plaintiff because "it
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"

once the trial court informed him there would be no need for it.
It was incumbent on plaintiff to repeat his request, given the
trial court's explanation, if in fact he thought a Canfield
instruction was still necessary.

Plaintiff never gave the trial

court an opportunity to consider the argument he raises here.
This is fatal to his appeal.
As is customary, the trial court distributed a set of jury
instructions prior to the jury instruction conference with
counsel.

He started by eliciting exceptions to instructions he

planned to give. (R. 352, lines 7-8)

Plaintiff immediately

turned to Instruction No. 19. (R. 352, lines 14-15)

His

exception was to the phrase "business invitee," a distinction
which he said had been "abolished in Utah by higher courts." (R.
352, lines 17-21)

He argued that a "comparative standard" of

negligence should be used instead. (R. 352, lines 21-22)

He

went on to say that actual knowledge of a dangerous condition is
not necessary "where expectable acts of third parties would
create a dangerous condition,..." (R. 353, lines 2-3)

He then

asked for a Canfield instruction. (R. 353, lines 16-17)
The trial court responded by stating that he was not going
to give defendant's instruction, which asked for a notice
requirement. (R. 354, lines 3-5)

He thought this was one of

those cases "where the hazard essentially has been created by
the owner, if in fact one has been created, and therefore he has
notice of that and [notice is] not required." (R. 354, lines 911)

Since he was dispensing with the notice requirement, there
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It goes without saying that "objections [to jury
instructions] must be made before the instructions are given to
the jury;..." Rule 51, U.R.C.P.

What follows from this is " [n]o

party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto." Rule 51.

It is obvious

that plaintiff failed to inform the trial court of the objection
he raises here.

The trial court had no way of knowing that

plaintiff still wanted a Canfield instruction.

Given the nature

of the discussion, the trial court could safely assume that
plaintiff had abandoned his request for a Canfield instruction.
Once the trial court informed plaintiff that since there would
be no "notice" instruction there was no need for a "Canfield"
instruction, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to state his
disagreement so the error, if there was one, could be corrected.
To preserve an objection on appeal, "a party must object
with specificity at trial." Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium
Company, 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985).

"An objection to an

instruction must be sufficiently precise to alert the trial
court to all claimed error and to give the judge an opportunity
to make any corrections deemed necessary." Pioneer Valley
Hospital. 830 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 1992).
rule is obvious:

The purpose for this

"When the trial judge has such notice, he or

she is able to correct an error before the jury retires." Id.
(citing Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Company,
669 P.2d 859, 860-61 (Utah 1983)).

The error that plaintiff

complains about is one that could have been raised before the
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1 1, and III

II.

SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT ON
"NOTICE," A CANFIELD INSTRUCTION WAS
UNNECESSARY.

Both plaintiff and the trial court agreed that premises
liability should be stated in terms of reasonable care.

This

appears to be consistent with Utah law on the subject. Dwiggins
y. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) .

Instruction

No. 19 is stated in terms of reasonable care. (R. 108)

In this

appeal, plaintiff is saying that he wanted something in addition
to what is stated in Instruction No. 19 (a Canfield
instruction).

This dispute centers on what has become known as

the "notice" requirement of premises liability.
Defendant (the landowner) requested an instruction based on
Martin v. Safewav Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977),
requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant "knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that a dangerous
condition existed,..."

Plaintiff countered with an instruction

based on Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d at 1226,
dispensing with the notice requirement in cases where the
"storeowner, its agents, or employees create or are responsible
for the dangerous condition."

The trial court refused to give

defendant's notice instruction.

He viewed this as a case where

the property owner could not possibly contest notice, since it
was the one who created the hazardous condition (assuming there
was one). The trial court's decision not to give the notice
instruction is not at issue here.
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FAILURE TO GIVE A CANFIELD INSTRUCTION MADE
NO DIFFERENCE IN THIS CASE SINCE THE JURY
FOUND FOR PLAINTIFF ON HIS NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
A G A I N S T DEFENDANT.
The jury was never told that "notice" was an issue,
Therefore, :- was total! 1 , Mf'.pcpp^flr,
i list i" ii" 1

u'licc: was not an .sbti.

II "1 1, , ,< a n
. r notice had been

an issue, defendant might have escaped liability because of lack
of notice.

The fact that defendant was found liable signifies

that whatever error was made in Instruction No. 19 was perfectly
harmless.
Although the Court of Appeals was reversed the last time it
applied this logic, the facts in that case were different from
those here.

In Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation,

862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that an error in an instruction on negligence was overcome by
the jury's verdict, in plaintiff's favor, on negligence.

The

Supreme Court, however, concluded that the error in the
instruction also went to proximate cause, and since the jury
found against plaintiff on proximate cause, it could not be said
the error was harmless (though the Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeals for other reasons). 862 P.2d at 1346.
Court of Appeals does not have the same problem here.

The
The jury

found defendant liable, which means it answered both the
negligence and proximate cause questions in plaintiff's favor.
Plaintiff argues (in his brief) that the jury might have
been persuaded by arguments that plaintiff did not report the
incident. (Page 12)

Plaintiff has read these arguments

completely out of context.
important reasons.

They were permissible for two very

First, there was a question as to whether

there was a hazardous condition in the loading bay on the day in
question.

There was substantial evidence that other drivers

worked in that same spot and had no problems that day. (RR. 337,
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348)

Defendant was entitled to suggest that plaintiff's failure

to report the incident bore on whether a hazardous condition
existed:

"You would think if there had been a big problem,

[plaintiff] would have told us, even after the fact." (R. 368,
lines 15-17)

Second, contributory negligence was definitely an

issue in the case.

Defendant used the fact that plaintiff

failed to report the incident as an indication of contributory
negligence:

"If it was slippery, you should have stopped what

you are doing.

You don't have to move your truck, that's fine,

but go get some help.

Go tell somebody that there is a problem.

That's what Paul's job is to do.

It would have been the

simplest thing in the world to do this.

Go tell him." (R. 370,

lines 15-20)
Defendant did not argue for dismissal based on lack of
notice.

The arguments that were made were perfectly appropriate

for the issues that were legitimately in the case.

In any

event, plaintiff failed to object to the arguments, so this
issue cannot be considered here.

The jury was not confused.

Notice was not an issue in the case.

The trial court was

entirely correct in the way it instructed the jury on this
important point.
IV.

IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION
TO AWARD AS COSTS FEES DEFENDANT WAS
REQUIRED TO PAY PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS.

Plaintiff reads the provision for costs too narrowly.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) states that costs
are "generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner
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provided by statute." 605 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added).
decision goes on to say:

The

"Subject to the limitation expressed

above, this Court has taken the position that the trial court
can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of
costs;..." id. at 773-74 (emphasis added).

Morgan v. Morgan,

795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990) is also read too narrowly:
"Witness compensation in excess of the statutory schedule is
generally inappropriate as a cost." 795 P.2d at 687 (emphasis
added).
What is significant is that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(1) is considered to be the "basic statutory provision"
when it comes to awarding costs. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d at
773 (emphasis added).

Defendant's claim for the $300 appearance

fee to Dr. Paulos is based another Utah Rule of Civil Procedure,
26(b)(4)(C)(i):

"Unless manifest injustice would result, the

court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule;..."

Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) governs "discovery by other

means," which includes depositions.

In other words, defendant

was required by Rule 26 to pay Dr. Paulos a fee for attending
his deposition.

It is difficult to see how the trial court

abused his discretion in awarding this as cost.
There is an important distinction between this and the two
cases cited by plaintiff.

The Courts in those cases denied as

costs expenses associated with the expert witnesses of the
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prevailing parties.

That would be like defendant trying to

recover the expenses associated with its own expert witnesses,
assuming it had expert witnesses.

Neither Court had to deal

with the situation presented here, where the prevailing party
had to pay a fee to the expert witness of the other party in
order to take that witness' deposition.

It is important to note

that plaintiff "does not contest whether the deposition was
taken in good faith or essential for the development and
presentation of the case." (Pages 13-14)

Plaintiff offers no

good reason why defendant should not recover all expenses
necessarily incident to the deposition he agrees was necessary
for the development and presentation of the case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has waived his objection to Instruction No. 19.
His objection is not well taken because notice was not an issue
in this case.

Since plaintiff prevailed on his negligence claim

against defendant, it is clear whatever error was done was
harmless.

The trial court was well within his discretion when

it awarded plaintiff's expert witness fee as cost.
Respectfully submitted this

of August, 1994.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-333 3
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